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| 经济学家日历：罗纳德·哈里·科斯 |
作者： 发布时间：2007-11-25 15:25:41 来源： 点击数：129
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Ronald H. Coase
(born December 29, 1910)
经济体制结构的突破者
通过对微观经济理论的扩展，罗纳德·科斯阐述了经济组织的产生原理，为我们理解经济运行方式提供了一个全新的观点。他的成就有力地推动了法学、经济史和组织理论的发展，并且在跨学科研究方面也起到了重要的作用。 ——1991年瑞典皇家科学院贺辞
罗纳德·哈里·科斯（Ronald Harry Coase）
1910年12月29日，罗纳德·哈里·科斯出生于伦敦的威尔斯登。科斯是个有腿疾的男孩子，常需要在腿上附加铁制的零件，所以他上的是地方委员会办的残疾人学校。1927年，他参加大学入学考试，顺利通过，历史和化学成绩优异。当时他倾向于得到一个历史学位，但是由于他没有学过拉丁文，所以他转向化学，又由于数学的原因，他再次转科，去学了商业方面的专业。后来他顺利通过进入伦敦大学所必需的中间考试，并于1929年10进入伦敦经济学院继续商学士学位的学习。
在那里，他遇到了对他有重要影响的老师。以前在南非开普敦大学任教授的阿诺德·普兰特在1930年被任命为伦敦经济学院商业教授。科斯去听普兰特的企业管理讲演，并在考试前5个月开始参加普兰特的讨论班，普兰特在讨论班说的话，改变了科斯对经济系统运转的见解。普兰特做的事是将亚当·斯密的“看不见的手”介绍给他，使他了解到一个竞争经济系统如何可以被定价系统协调。科斯说：“普兰特不仅影响我的思想，还改变了我的一生。”1931年科斯通过了商学士考试。他原本想研究工业法，如果这样，他将成为一个律师。但是他在普兰特的影响下，改变了初衷。此时，伦敦大学授予科斯一笔欧奈斯特·卡塞尔爵士旅行奖学金，这使他走上了成为一位经济学家的道路。
依靠卡塞尔旅行奖金，科斯在美国度过了1931～1932学年。那时他研究美国工业的结构，目的在于发现工业为什么以不同方式组织起来。他主要通过访问工厂和企业来进行这个项目的研究。他在经济分析中引入了“交易费用”这一新概念以及对为什么有企业做了一个解释。这些思想成为1937年科斯发表的《企业的性质》的基础。瑞典皇家科学院授予他1991年诺贝尔经济学奖时曾引用了这篇文章的内容。1934～1935年，他在利物浦大学任教，1935年以后，在伦敦经济学院教书。在伦敦经济学院，他被指定讲授公用事业经济学。为此他对英国公用事业做了一系列的研究。1939年，第二次世界大战爆发，1940年，科斯进政府做统计工作，先在森林委员会，然后在中央统计局，后来在战时内阁办公室。1946年，回到伦敦经济学院，负责教授主要经济学课程——经济学原理，并继续对公用事业特别是邮局和广播事业的研究。科斯借助于一笔洛克菲勒研究员经费在美国花费了9个月研究美国广播业，他的书《美国广播业：垄断的研究》在1950年出版。1951年，科斯获得伦敦大学理学博士学位，同年移居美国。
刚到美国，科斯就进了布法罗大学，在那里他做了7年教授（1951～1958）。1959年，在行为科学高等中心工作一年之后，他加入弗吉尼亚大学经济学系。科斯对联邦通信委员会做了研究。它管制美国广播业，包括配置无线电频率谱。他写了一篇文章，1959年发表，讨论这个委员会遵循的程序，并且提议如果频率的利用由定价系统确定而给予出价最高的人将更好。这一点引起成功的投标人将得到什么权利的争议，科斯讨论的是一个财产权系统的合理性研究。芝加哥大学的一些经济学家们认为他的论点有一部分是错的。于是他又写了一篇文章——《社会成本问题》，更详细、更精确地阐明了自己的见解，于1961年初发表。与他以前发表的《企业的性质》不同，它一经发表，即被广泛援引和热烈讨论。它大概是全部现代经济学文献中被引用最多的文章了。
主要学术贡献
科斯“因为对经济的体制结构取得突破性的研究成果”，荣获1991年诺贝尔经济学奖。他的杰出贡献是发现并阐明了交换成本和产权在经济组织和制度结构中的重要性及其在经济活动中的作用。科斯的代表作是两篇著名的论文，其一是1937年发表的《企业的本质》，该文独辟蹊径地讨论了企业存在的原因及其扩展规模的界限问题，科斯创造了“交易成本”这一重要概念来予以解释。所谓交易成本，即“利用价格机制的费用”或“利用市场的交换手段进行交易的费用”，包括提供价格的费用、讨价还价的费用、订立和执行合同的费用等。科斯认为，当市场交易成本高于企业内部的管理协调成本时，企业便产生了，企业的存在正是为了节约市场交易费用，即用费用较低的企业内部交易代替费用较高的市场交易；当市场交易的边际成本等于企业内部管理协调的边际成本时，就是企业规模扩张的界限。科斯另一篇著名论文是1961年发表的《社会成本问题》，该文重新研究了交易成本为零时合约行为的特征，批评了庇古关于“外部性”问题的补偿原则（政府干预），并论证了在产权明确的前提下，市场交易即使在出现社会成本（即外部性）的场合也同样有效。科斯发现，一旦假定交易成本为零，而且对产权（指财产使用权，即运行和操作中的财产权利）界定是清晰的，那么法律规范并不影响合约行为的结果，即最优化结果保持不变。换言之，只要交易成本为零，那么无论产权归谁，都可以通过市场自由交易达到资源的最佳配置。斯蒂格勒（1982年诺贝尔经济学奖得主）将科斯的这一思想概括为“在完全竞争条件下，私人成本等于社会成本”，并命名为“科斯定理”。
科斯定理
科斯定理最早体现在1959年10月号《法律经济学》杂志上发表的《联邦通讯委员会》一文。在这篇文章中，科斯以无线电频率为例，对产权进行了经济分析，创造性地提出了下列观点：
产权是重要的。在政府管制前，造成无线电领域争夺频率的混乱状况的真正原因不是频率数量有限，也不是竞争机制失灵而需要政府管制，而是因为没有建立无线电频率的产权制度。同频率一样，土地、资金也都是稀缺资源，但它们本身并不要求政府管制。有些机制，如常用的价格机制，被用来确定如何在众多提出权利要求的人之间配置稀缺资源，如土地可以通过价格机制分配给土地使用者。但是，如果没有建立土地产权制度，任何人都可以占用土地，那么社会会发生混乱，价格机制起不了作用，其原因是因为没有可供交易的产权。对资源不设置产权，企业制度就不能正常运行。
资源的市场配置优于政府配置。资源配置应当由市场力量而不是由政府决策决定。除了政治压力所导致的错误配置外，一个试图取代价格机制功能的行政机构将会碰到两大难题：首先是缺乏本应由市场决定收益与成本的货币量化标准；其次，行政机构实际上不可能拥有每个商业经营者使用或可能使用无线电频率的所有信息，也不了解消费者对运用无线电频率提供的产品或劳务的偏好。不过，这也并不意味着行政分配必然劣于价格机制分配。市场运行不是没有成本，如果市场运行的成本大大超过行政机构运行的成本，人们就可能会默认行政配置造成的失误。
法律要明确界定产权。新发现的山洞是属于发现它的人，还是属于山洞入口处的土地所有者，或是属于山洞顶上的土地所有者，这无疑取决于财产法，但是法律只规定想获得山洞使用权的人必须与山洞的所有权者签约。至于山洞是用来贮藏银行账簿，贮存天然气，还是种植蘑菇，这与财产法没有关系，而与银行、天然气公司和蘑菇种植者为使用山洞而支付费用的多寡有关。法律制度的目标之一就是建立明晰的权利界限，使权利能在此基础上通过市场进行转移和重新组合，应当允许一个使用者买下他人的权利以独占使用权。
使用一种资源与使用对这种资源的权利在分析上没有区别。以“斯特古斯诉布里奇曼案”为例，制糖商机器的噪声与震动干扰了隔壁医生的工作，法院必须决定，医生是否有权强迫制糖商安装新机器或挪动旧机器，或者制糖商是否有权强迫医生另择诊所。从这个案例的分析中可以看出：①在这种情况下，制止甲对乙的损害，不可避免地就会损害甲本身，问题在于如何避免比较严重的损害；②权利的界定是市场交易的基本前提，一旦建立了当事人的法律权利，那么只要有迹象表明谈判花费的成本有利于问题的解决，谈判就能够改变法律程序，产值最大化的最终结果与法律判决无关，目标不应该是干扰最小，而应该是产出最大。所有的产权都会干扰利用资源的能力，但必须保证从干扰中获得的收益大于产生的危害。
有损害的行为不但不影响产权的引入，而且由于利益冲突发生在个人之间，反倒使明晰产权成为必要和可能。比方说，邻近频率间的干扰的减少可能要花钱改善设备，如果邻近频率的经营权不明确，就很难指望一个频率的用户会为他人的利益花费这类成本。产权明晰（第一次配置）加上价格制度（第二次配置）将会解决这类冲突。只要信号受干扰的台主获得的收益大于因受干扰而遭受的损失，或者大于他为抵消干扰而支付的费用，那么即使他有权制止干扰，也会放弃这个权利；而干扰他人的台主为获得经营许可，自然愿意支付费用，但不能高于停止干扰导致的成本或不能以干扰他人的方式继续经营而造成的损失。同样，只要收益大于干扰成本或因干扰被禁止而蒙受的损失，那么即使他有权干扰他人也会放弃这个权利；受干扰的台主为使干扰停止，愿意支付费用，但不得高于因受干扰而遭受的损失或为消除干扰而花费的成本，无论哪一种情况，结果都一样。
如果受损害很多，就很难通过市场来解决。当在众多的共同经营者或组织之间必须通过市场形式进行产权转移时，谈判过程可能会非常费时和困难，从而使这种转移实际上不可能，即使通过法院来行使权力也不容易。在这种市场因成本太高而无法运行的情况下，强制实行规定人们应该做什么和不应该做什么的管制可能会好一些。
社会成本问题
亚当·斯密“看不见的手”的定理的成立要依赖于一个隐含的假定：单个消费者或生产者的经济行为对社会上其他人的福利没有影响，即不存在所谓“外部影响”。换句话说，单个经济单位从其经济行为中产生的私人成本和私人利益被看成等于该行为所造成的社会成本和社会利益。但是，在实际经济中，这个假定往往往并不能够成立。在很多时候，某个人（生产者或消费者）的一项经济活动会给社会上其他成员带来好处，但他自己却不能由此而得到补偿。此时，这个人从其活动中得到的私人利益就小于该活动所带来的社会利益。这种性质的外部影响被称为所谓的“外部经济”。另一方面，在很多时候，某个人的一项经济活动会给社会上其他成员带来危害，但他自己却并不为此而支付足够抵偿这种危害的成本。此时，这个人为其活动所付出的私人成本就小于该活动所造成的社会成本。这种性质的外部影响被称为所谓“外部不经济”。
科斯在《社会成本问题》一文中所述的就是第二种情况，即对他人产生有害影响的工商企业的行为（如工厂放出的烟尘对邻居的影响）。对这种情况，传统经济分析遵循庇古在《福利经济学》中提出的观点，抓住私人产品和社会产品的矛盾，得出了要排烟的厂主赔偿损失，或对他课征“庇古”税，或令他迁走的纠正办法，而科斯认为，把这种问题归结为由于甲损害乙，所以应该制止甲的传统做法，错误地掩盖了问题的实质。实际上这种外部效应问题具有相互性，又称不兼容性。避免甲对乙的损害，将会使甲遭受损害，必须解决的真正问题是允许甲损害乙，还是允许乙制止损害，关键在于避免较严重的损害，并且应当从总体的和边际的角度来认识问题。
科斯以养牛者走失的牛损坏毗邻的农夫土地上种植的谷物一例作为分析的起点，假设了这样两种相反的情况：一种情况是令养牛者对损害负责任，也就是说，农夫有谷物不受损害的权利，养牛者没有让牛损害谷物的权利，不然，就要赔偿全部损失。在这种情况下，只要付费，奶牛能吃谷，牛群的规模应是牛多吃谷物增加的价值恰好等于谷物的边际损失。另一种情况是养牛者对损害不负责任，也就是说，他有让牛吃谷物的权利，不必赔偿由此造成的损害。在这种情况下，由于农夫可将谷物损失的价值转移给养牛者，所以牛群的规模不会增加。通过简化的算术例子，科斯引出了以下结论：“有必要知道损害方是否对引起的损失负责，因为如果没有这种权利的初始界定，就不存在权利转让和重新组合的市场交易。但是，如果定价制度的运行毫无成本，最终的结果（产值最大化）是不受法律状况影响的。”换句话说，如果交易成本为零，那么在引起损害的企业对损害结果不承担责任情况下的资源配置就同该企业承担责任时的情况一样。
为了进一步阐明其论点，并表明其普遍适用性，科斯接着又分析了“斯特奇诉布里奇曼”、“库克诉福布斯”、“布赖思诉勒菲弗”和“巴斯诉雷戈里”四案，并再次强调，“在市场交易成本为零时，法院关于损害责任的判决对资源的配置没有影响”，“应该记住，法院面临的迫切问题不是谁做什么，而是谁有权做什么。通过市场交易修改最初的合法界定通常是可能的。当然，如果这种市场交易是无成本的，那么通常会出现对权利的重新安排，假如这种安排会导致产值增加的话”。这些表述，其实就是后来被称作“中性的科斯定理”（Neutrality Version of Coase Theorem）的内容。按照参托·维尔加诺斯基的看法，这个定理隐含的假定前提还包括：
◇自愿交换是互惠的斯密定理；
◇完全的知识（生产、利润和效用函数等）；
◇竞争市场；
◇最大化目标；
◇免费的法律制度；
◇无策略行为；
◇无财富效应。
然而，科斯本人却不愿停留在这个交易成本为零的所谓的科斯世界里。他在1980年发表的《〈社会成本问题〉的注释》一文中指出，科斯世界正是他极力说服经济学家离开的世界，传统经济学错就错在忽略了交易成本。人们应该研究存在正交易成本的现实世界，在这个世界中，法律制度至关重要。由于市场中交易的东西不是像传统经济学所认为的实物，而是采取的行动和个人拥有的、由法律设置的权利，所以在交易费用为正的现实世界上，法律制度将会对经济体系的运行产生深远的影响。权利应该配置给那些能最富有生产性地使用它们的人，应该探索这样一种有效的产权制度。如果不对交易赖以进行的制度详细地加以规定，新古典经济学关于交换过程的讨论就毫无意义。
在《社会成本问题》的后几节里，科斯进入了正交易成本的世界：首先，发现交易对象，交流交易愿望和方式，谈判、缔约和履约都有成本；其次，如果这些成本大于权利调整带来的产值增加，禁令或赔偿就可能使权利的市场调整停止或不发生，因此，合法权利的初始界定会对经济运行的效率产生影响；再次，这时有利的权利调整也要由法律来确定，不然，转移和合并权利的高成本会使最佳配置和最大产值无法实现；最后，经济组织能以低于市场的成本获得有效的结果。这里有三种情况：一是由企业取代市场来配置资源——由于企业获得了所有各方面的合法权利，所以在企业内部，要素组合中的讨价还价被取消，行政指令取代了市场交易，企业活动的重新安排不再是用契约对权利进行调整的结果，而是行政决定的结果。二是政府直接管制，这不是制定可由市场调整权利的法律，而是强制规定人们必须做什么和不许做什么，并要求人们必须服从。政府作为“超级企业”所拥有的权威可以减除不少麻烦，但这种办法也有成本，只有在其他办法无效时才会被采用。三是法院直接影响经济行为。法院在判决时就应该了解和考虑判决对经济的影响，显然，即使在科斯世界里，这样做也能减少交易成本和节约资源，但应明白，法院做出的实际上是关于资源使用的经济判决，这就启示人们，在界定权利这种属于法律范畴的问题上，经济学也大有用武之地。
科斯在该文结束时指出，土地所有者实际拥有的是实施一定行为的权利，对个人权利无限制的制度实际上就是无权利的制度，权利也是生产要素，在设计经济运行制度时，应该考虑总成本和总效果。这些意见的确耐人寻味，发人深思。
著作点击
科斯的主要著作包括：
《企业的本质》（1937）；
《边际成本争论》（1946）；
《美国广播业：垄断的研究》（1950）；
《联邦通讯委员会》（1959）；
《社会成本问题》（1960）；
《经济学中的灯塔问题》（1975）；
《企业、市场与法律》（1988）。
Ronald H. Coase – Autobiography
My father, a methodical man, recorded in his diary that I was born at 3:25 p.m. on December 29th, 1910. The place was a house, containing two flats of which my parents occupied the lower, in a suburb of London, Willesden. My father was a telegraphist in the Post Office. My mother had been employed in the Post Office but ceased to work on being married. Both my parents had left school at the age of 12 but were completely literate. However, they had no interest in academic scholarship. Their interest was in sport. My mother played tennis until an advanced age. My father, who played football, cricket and tennis while young, played (lawn) bowls until his death. He was a good player, played for his county and won a number of competitions. He wrote articles on bowls for the local newspaper and for Bowls News.
I had the usual boy's interest in sport but my main interest was always academic. I was an only child but although often alone, I was never lonely. When I learnt chess, I was happy to play the role of each player in turn. Lacking guidance, my reading (in books borrowed from the local public library) was undiscriminating and, as I now realize, I was unable to distinguish the charlatan from the serious scholar. My mother taught me to be honest and truthful and although it is impossible to escape some degree of self-deception, my endeavours to follow her precepts have, I believe, lent some strength to my writing. My mother's hero was Captain Oates, who, returning with Scott from the South Pole and finding that his illness was hampering the others, told his companions that he was going for a stroll, went out into a blizzard and was never heard of again. I have always felt that I should not be a bother to others but in this I have not always succeeded.
Aged 11, I was taken by my father to a phrenologist. What the phrenologist said about my character was, I feel sure, determined less by the shape of my skull than by the impressions he derived from my behaviour. Out of the various printed summaries of character in his booklet, that chosen for "Master Ronald Coase" started: "You are in possession of much intelligence, and you know it, though you may be inclined to underrate your abilities." This printed summary also included the following remarks: "You will not float down, like a sickly fish, with the tide... you enjoy considerable mental vigour and are not a passive instrument in the hands of others. Though you can work with others and for others, where you see it to your advantage, you are more inclined to think and work for yourself. A little more determination would be to your advantage, however." In the written comments, the pursuits recommended were: "Scientific and commercial banking, accountancy. Also, horticulture and poultry-rearing as hobbies." Added were some comments about my character: "More hope, confidence and concentration required - not suited for the aggressive competitive side of business life. More active ambition would be beneficial." It was also noted that I was too cautious. It was hardly to be expected that this timid little boy would one day be the recipient of a Nobel Prize. That this happened was the result of a series of accidents.
As a young boy I suffered from a weakness in my legs, which necessitated, or was thought to necessitate, the wearing of irons on my legs. As a result I went to the school for physical defectives run by the local council. For reasons that I do not remember I missed taking the entrance examinations for the local secondary school at the usual age of 11. However, as the result of the efforts of my parents I was allowed to take the secondary school scholarship examination at the age of 12. The only thing I now remember is that at the oral examination I caused some amusement by referring to a character in Shakespeare's Twelfth Night as Macvolio. However, this lapse was not fatal and I was awarded a scholarship to go to the Kilburn Grammar School. The teaching there was good and I received a solid education. I particularly remember our geography teacher, Charles Thurston, who introduced us to Wegener's hypothesis on the movements of the continents long before it was generally accepted and who also took us to lectures at the Royal Geographical Society, one of which, on river meanders, discussed the effect of the earth's rotation on the course of rivers. I took the matriculation examination in 1927, which I passed, with distinction in history and chemistry.
It was then possible to spend the two years after matriculation at the Kilburn Grammar School studying for the intermediate examination of the University of London as an external student, which covered the work which would have been taken during the first year at the University as an internal student. I then had to decide what degree to take. The answer was in fact determined by one of those accidental factors which seem to have shaped my life. My inclination was to take a degree in history, but I found that to do this I would have to know Latin and having arrived at the Kilburn Grammar School at 12 instead of 11, there had been no possibility of my studying Latin. So I turned to the other subject in which I had secured distinction and started to study for a science degree, specialising in chemistry. However, I soon found that mathematics, a requirement for a science degree, was not to my taste and I switched to the only other degree for which it was possible to study at the Kilburn Grammar School, one in commerce. Although my knowledge of the subjects on which I was examined was rudimentary, I managed to pass the intermediate examinations and went to the London School of Economics in October, 1929 to continue my studies for a Bachelor of Commerce degree. I took a hodgepodge of courses for Part I of the final examination, which I passed in 1930.
For Part II, I specialised in the Industry Group. I then had an extraordinary stroke of luck, another accidental factor which would affect everything I was to do subsequently. Arnold Plant, who had previously held a chair at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, was appointed Professor of Commerce (with special reference to Business Administration) at the London School of Economics in 1930. I attended his lectures on business administration but it was what he said in his seminar, which I started to attend only five months before the final examinations, that was to change my view of the working of the economic system, or perhaps more accurately was to give me one. What Plant did was to introduce me to Adam Smith's "invisible hand". He made me aware of how a competitive economic system could be coordinated by the pricing system. But he did not merely influence my ideas. My encountering him changed my life. I passed the B. Com, Part II final examination in 1931, but having taken the first year of University work while still at school and three years residence at the London School of Economics being required before a degree could be awarded, I had to decide what to do in this third year. Among the subjects studied for Part II, the one I had found most interesting was Industrial Law and what I had decided to do was to study in this third year for the degree of B.Sc. (Econ), with Industrial Law as my special subject. Had I done so I would undoubtedly have gone on to become a lawyer. But that was not to be. No doubt as a result of Plant's influence, the University of London awarded me a Sir Ernest Cassel Travelling Scholarship and although I did not know it, I was on the road to becoming an economist.
I spent the academic year 1931-32 on my Cassel Travelling Scholarship in the United States studying the structure of American industries, with the aim of discovering why industries were organized in different ways. I carried out this project mainly by visiting factories and businesses. What came out of my enquiries was not a complete theory answering the questions with which I started but the introduction of a new concept into economic analysis, transaction costs, and an explanation of why there are firms. All this was achieved by the Summer of 1932, as the contents of a lecture delivered in Dundee in October 1932, make clear. These ideas became the basis for my article "The Nature of the Firm", published in 1937, cited by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences in awarding me the 1991 Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. The delay in publishing my ideas was partly due to a reluctance to rush into print and partly to the fact that I was heavily engaged in teaching and research on other projects. I held a teaching position at the Dundee School of Economics and Commerce from 1932 to 1934, at the University of Liverpool from 1934 to 1935 and at the London School of Economics from 1935 on. At the London School of Economics I was assigned a course on the economics of public utilities in Britain. In 1939, the Second World War broke out and in 1940 I entered government service doing statistical work, first at the Forestry Commission and then at the Central Statistical Office, Offices of the War Cabinet. I returned to the London School of Economics in 1946. I then became responsible for the main economics course, "The Principles of Economics", and also continued with my research on public utilities, particularly the Post Office and broadcasting. I spent nine months in 1948 in the United States on a Rockefeller Fellowship studying the American broadcasting industry. My book, British Broadcasting: A Study in Monopoly, was published in 1950.
In 1951, I migrated to the United States. I went first to the University of Buffalo and in 1959, after a year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, I joined the economics department of the University of Virginia. I maintained my interest in public utilities and particularly in broadcasting and during my year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, I made a study of the Federal Communications Commission which regulated the broadcasting industry in the United States, including the allocation of the radio frequency spectrum. I wrote an article, published in 1959, which discussed the procedures followed by the Commission and suggested that it would be better if use of the spectrum was determined by the pricing system and was awarded to the highest bidder. This raised the question of what rights would be acquired by the successful bidder and I went on to discuss the rationale of a property rights system. Part of my argument was considered to be erroneous by a number of economists at the University of Chicago and it was arranged that I should meet with them one evening at Aaron Director's home. What ensued has been described by Stigler and others. I persuaded these economists that I was right and I was asked to write up my argument for publication in the Journal of Law and Economics. Although the main points were already to be found in The Federal Communications Commission, I wrote another article, The Problem of Social Cost, in which I expounded my views at greater length, more precisely and without reference to my previous article. This article, which appeared early in 1961, unlike my earlier article on "The Nature of the Firm", was an instant success. It was, and continues to be, much discussed. Indeed it is probably the most widely cited article in the whole of the modern economic literature. It, and The Nature of the Firm were the two articles cited by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences as justification for awarding me the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize. Had it not been for the fact that these economists at the University of Chicago thought that I had made an error in my article on The Federal Communications Commission, it is probable that The Problem of Social Cost would never have been written.
In 1964, I moved to the University of Chicago and became editor of the Journal of Law and Economics. I continued as editor until 1982. Editorship of the journal was a source of great satisfaction. I encouraged economists and lawyers to write about the way in which actual markets operated and about how governments actually perform in regulating or undertaking economic activities. The journal was a major factor in creating the new subject, "law and economics". My life has been interesting, concerned with academic affairs and on the whole successful. But, on almost all occasions, what I have done has been determined by factors which were no part of my choosing. I have had "greatness thrust upon me".
From Les Prix Nobel. The Nobel Prizes 1991, Editor Tore Frängsmyr, [Nobel Foundation], Stockholm, 1992
This autobiography/biography was written at the time of the award and later published in the book series Les Prix Nobel/Nobel Lectures. The information is sometimes updated with an addendum submitted by the Laureate. To cite this document, always state the source as shown above.
Ronald H. Coase (1910- )
Ronald Coase is an unusual economist for the twentieth century, and highly unusual for a Nobel Prize winner (he won in 1991). First, his writings are sparse. In a sixty-year career he wrote only about a dozen significant papers—and very few insignificant ones. Second, he uses little or no mathematics, disdaining what he calls "blackboard economics." Yet his impact on economics has been profound. That impact stems almost entirely from two of his articles, one of which was published when he was twenty seven. The other was published twenty-three years later.
Coase conceived of the first article, "The Nature of the Firm," while still an undergraduate on a trip to the United States from his native Britain. At the time he was a socialist, and he dropped in on perennial presidential candidate of the Socialist party Norman Thomas. He also visited Ford and General Motors and came up with a puzzle: how could economists say that Lenin was wrong in thinking that the Russian economy could be run like one big factory, when some pretty big firms in the United States seemed to be run very well? In answering his own question, Coase came up with a fundamental insight about why firms exist. Firms are like centrally planned economies, he wrote, but unlike the latter, they are formed because of people's voluntary choices. But why do people make these choices? The answer, wrote Coase, is "marketing costs." (Economists now use the term "transactions costs.") If markets were costless to use, firms would not exist. Instead, people would make arm's-length transactions. But because markets are costly to use, the most efficient production process often takes place in a firm. His explanation of why firms exist is now the accepted one and has given rise to a whole literature on the issue. Coase's article was cited 169 times in academic journals between 1966 and 1980.
"The Problem of Social Cost," Coase's other widely cited article (661 citations between 1966 and 1980), was even more path-breaking. Indeed, it gave rise to the field called law and economics. Economists b.c. (Before Coase) of virtually all political persuasions had accepted British economist Arthur Pigou's idea that if, say, a cattle rancher's cows destroy his neighboring farmer's crops, the government should stop the rancher from letting his cattle roam free or should at least tax him for doing so. Otherwise, believed economists, the cattle would continue to destroy crops because the rancher would have no incentive to stop them.
But Coase challenged the accepted view. He pointed out that if the rancher had no legal liability for destroying the farmer's crops, and if transaction costs were zero, the farmer could come to a mutually beneficial agreement with the rancher under which the farmer paid the rancher to cut back on his herd of cattle. This would happen, argued Coase, if the damage from additional cattle exceeded the rancher's net returns on these cattle. If for example, the rancher's net return on a steer was two dollars, then the rancher would accept some amount over two dollars to give up the additional steer. If the steer was doing three dollars' worth of harm to the crops, then the farmer would be willing to pay the rancher up to three dollars to get rid of the steer. A mutually beneficial bargain would be struck.
Coase considered what would happen if the courts made the rancher liable for the damage caused by his steers. Economists b.c. had thought that the number of steers raised by the rancher would be affected. But Coase showed that the only thing affected would be the wealth of the rancher and the farmer; the number of cattle and the amount of crop damage, he showed, would be the same. In the above example, the farmer would insist that the rancher pay at least three dollars for the right to have the extra steer roaming free. But because the extra steer was worth only two dollars to the rancher, he would be willing to pay only up to two dollars. Therefore, the steer would not be raised, the same outcome as when the rancher was not liable.
This insight was stunning. It meant that the case for government intervention was weaker than economists had thought. Yet Coase's soulmates at the free-market-oriented University of Chicago wondered, according to George Stigler, "how so fine an economist could make such an obvious mistake." So they invited Coase, who was then at the University of Virginia, to come to Chicago to discuss it. They had dinner at the home of Aaron Director, the economist who had founded the Journal of Law and Economics.
Stigler writes:
We strongly objected to this heresy. Milton Friedman did most of the talking, as usual. He also did much of the thinking, as usual. In the course of two hours of argument the vote went from twenty against and one for Coase to twenty-one for Coase. What an exhilarating event! I lamented afterward that we had not had the clairvoyance to tape it.
Stigler himself labeled Coase's insight the Coase Theorem.
Of course, because transaction costs are never zero and sometimes are very high, courts are still needed to adjudicate between farmers and ranchers. Moreover, strategic behavior by the parties involved can prevent them from reaching the agreement, even if the gains from agreeing outweigh the transactions costs.
So why were economists so excited by the Coase Theorem? The reason is that it made them look differently at many issues. Take divorce. University of Colorado economist H. Elizabeth Peters showed empirically that whether a state has traditional barriers to divorce or divorce on demand has no effect on the divorce rate. This is contrary to conventional wisdom but consistent with the Coase Theorem. If the sum of a couple's net gains from marriage, as seen by the couple, is negative, then no agreement on distributing the gains from the marriage can keep them together. All the traditional divorce law did was enhance the bargaining position of women. A husband who wanted out much more than his wife wanted him in could compensate his wife to let him out. Not surprisingly, divorce-on-demand laws have made women who get divorces financially worse off, just as the absence of liability for the rancher in our example made the farmer worse off.
Coase has also upset the apple cart in the realm of public goods. Economists often give the lighthouse as an example of a public good that only government can provide. They choose this example, not based on any information they have about lighthouses, but rather on their a priori view that lighthouses could not be privately owned and operated at a profit. Coase showed, with a detailed look at history, that lighthouses in nineteenth-century Britain were privately provided and that ships were charged for their use when they came into port.
Coase earned his doctorate from the University of London in 1951 and emigrated to the United States, where he was a professor at the University of Buffalo from 1951 to 1958, then at the University of Virginia from 1958 to 1964, and then at the University of Chicago from 1964 to 1979, when he retired. Today Coase is a senior fellow in law and economics at the University of Chicago.
Selected Works
"The Nature of the Firm." Economica 4 (November 1937): 386-405.
"Business organization and the accountant," in L.S.E. Essays on Cost, James M. Buchanan and Thirlby, G. F., eds. 1973. Based on various publications, 1938.
"The Federal Communications Commission." Journal of Law and Economics 2 (October 1959): 1-40.
"The Problem of Social Cost." Journal of Law and Economics 3 (October 1960): 1-44.
"The Lighthouse in Economics." Journal of Law and Economics 17, no. 2 (October 1974): 357-76.
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